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Introduction

The evolution of athletics into organized sports is a feat nothing short of
astonishing, with its current state largely affecting the economic wellbeing of billions
worldwide. While sports are an escape from real life, the business of sports is quite real.
On and off the field, the ecstasy of victory is so universally attractive that it causes fans
and investors to lose sight of reality, and obsess over the game.
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But while sports may be like a game, it exists as a hub of the entertainment
industry, with its professional levels earning multi-billion dollars yearly in the Unites
States alone. Everything associated with sports is about competition, and the game’s
players at every level will do whatever it takes to be a winner. Whether it’s the players
on the field, the owners of the teams, or the politicians responsible for approving the
construction of a team’s new home, the intrinsic motivations may be different, but their
fundamental purpose is entirely the same: play to win.
Housing a professional sports team is a feat desired by almost any city with deep
enough pockets. Sports bring recognition, brand, and a quest for superiority against other
cities. We are united by the romance of sports, as while we watch or follow our team, we
forget about the harsh realities, either in our lives, or in the constructs of modern
professional sports. From a political perspective, the ability to bring one’s city together to
assert its dominance against another may seem like a feat that triumphs economic
limitations. But dreaming about a team is one thing; actually housing a professional
franchise is another. Like all public policy decisions, providing a stadium for a
professional sports franchise requires careful consideration of multiple factors.
Since public policy began to support sports entertainment in the early 1900s, tens
of billions of dollars have been paid by taxpayers to developers and owners of
professional sports stadiums and arenas (Keating 1999). In light of the 2008 financial
crisis, heavy competition has arisen for public investment, while sports seem to continue
to receive public funds. Traditional recipients in sectors such as public safety and
education appear to be suffering, and one must question the political leaders’ willingness
to make sports entertainment a priority. In the face of much controversy, it has become
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clear that there are few economic benefits related to the practice, yet the policy seems
likely to continue at the current rapid pace.
The main focus of this paper revolves around the argument of whether
governmental subsidies towards stadium and arena construction are necessary, fair, or
economically sound. This paper argues that the extent of public money allocated to
stadium construction is inappropriate, and its return on investment is unsustainable.
The discussion begins by providing a brief contextual history of the issues surrounding
public money towards stadiums. Analysis of the arguments for the use of these funds
will come next, including an evaluation of the political strategies used to secure taxpayer
money for the projects. Discussion will follow on the further arguments against using
heavy subsidies to finance professional sports stadium construction. These issues will be
connected to economic literature, largely focusing on community welfare and alternative
ideas.
The question, then, becomes: what is the cost of winning? What does it take to
“win” the stadium game, and who comes out on top in the end?
Winning here, describes not only the on-field performance by a professional team,
but also the decision-making games played by leaders of stadium finance and
development. The research for this paper proves that public subsidies, currently invested
in over 80% of the stadiums and arenas in my sample, do not guarantee success for the
venue.
With such disparities in regards to the true economic impact of housing a
professional sports team on a city’s economy, determining the correct way to fund a
stadium is extraordinarily variable and difficult to quantify. If we assume that
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professional sports will continue to demand new stadiums for their team operations at
alarming rates, it must be assumed that current stadium projects are inefficient, failing to
take various welfare measurements into full account. This paper will ask how can the
process of developing and financing stadiums be improved, and what factors will help
contribute to creating a successful professional sports stadium.
Although I will focus on many aspects and strategies of general stadium finance, I
am most critical about the persistent heavy public funding towards stadiums and arenas.
Professional sports are likely more private than public goods, but the endeavors are
supported as if they’re public utilities. Heavy subsidies, which don’t tend to create
equitable returns, and aren’t clearly necessary to build a quality product in the first place,
continue to be budgeted towards stadium construction.
In short, professional leagues act as a cartel. The four major professional sports
leagues all enjoy monopoly power and government support, preventing market entry, and
hurting consumers. Leagues have the free ability to limit supply of franchises (usually to
around thirty teams) in manners that don’t reflect market demand. Leagues and teams
receive governmental legislative and financial support to segment the market, and drive
up prices. By achieving this scarcity, professional sports are apt to receive further
subsidies, tax exemptions, and fan interest. There are few industries in the United States
that enjoy the monopoly powers of professional sports.
Sports stadiums are built to benefit both private and public welfare; however, the
public frequently pays an unfair percentage of the costs, without enjoying a fair benefit.
Governmental support for stadium construction is inconsistent with economic literature.
Findings show that few jobs are actually created, urban renewal arguments are limited,
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and income is unreasonably evaluated and inappropriately allocated, leading subsidy
advocates to fabricate or simply ignore data. Sports economists find that city welfare is
hardly enhanced by stadium construction.
Through an examination of the necessities, tendencies, and purpose of public
subsidies towards sports stadiums and arenas, I’ve developed a definition for stadium and
arena “success,” that requires both high attendance, and a low public subsidy. This
metric will be regressed in a logit statistical model with variable factors likely to be
correlated with a successful stadium or arena, to determine which variables are most
related to a successful stadium. By combining an economic analysis of the
implementation of subsidies in stadium finance, and applying it to a model to determine
the relevance of quantifiable factors of success, this paper will attempt to determine some
of what it takes to be victorious in the game of stadium development.

Evaluating and Refuting Arguments and Strategies to Implement Public Subsidies

To begin, every project is different, and various reasons for public money are
argued, depending on the circumstance. Even the leadership and support for public
money is variable. Delaney points out that the leadership is different in each project, but
is often led by politicians and business leaders through a “growth coalition”, often
disregarding of public sentiment (Delaney 205). This analysis will explore and discuss
the legitimacy of the different sorts of arguments used by these players.
The simplest argument is that of the multiplier effect of stadium construction. By
building it, more people will come to the surrounding area, and will spend money inside,
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and more importantly, outside the stadium. In theory, this would lead to further
economic growth and development. The advancements could include fans spending
additional money at restaurants before and after the game, or exploring other offerings
near the city. Stadiums are attractions that should “put feet on the street… and heads in
the beds” (Delaney 21). If so, a city would experience related economic development in
the form of more shopping, restaurants, and hotels, and would thrive as more people
would be visiting and spending time in the district. The effects of this would include
increases in tax revenue, city beautification, and general income.
The highly coveted job creation argument will first be deconstructed. According
to Delaney, residents are promised new jobs to for the stadium’s construction and
permanent jobs that will “enhance local tax revenues, ticket sales, concession sales, and
income tax from new employee wages” (Delaney 23). The jobs created by new stadium
construction may or may not employ residents, and are only temporary. Yet, as many
professional stadiums are already in existence in popular markets, most new building
construction represents a replacement for one outdated. Thus, few permanent new jobs
are created, but rather transferred from the old facility. Further questionable is the new
employee income and sales tax revenue, as much of this comes from players and owners
of the team who frequently live in different municipalities, paying taxes elsewhere.
Rosentraub and Delaney estimate that a stadium is a very minimal source of a large city’s
total employment, at around 0.2% (Delaney 191).
Measuring the economic impact of a stadium’s presence is highly variable. Baade
(1996) looked at cities before and after the construction of stadiums during the later part
of the 20th century, and found that the creation of jobs and net economic effect are
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insignificant, that in no instances did a city experience a positive economic impact.
Many variables are difficult to control or identify, and timing is an issue.
Other studies vouching for subsidies seem to make invalid assumptions, or rely on
an irregular premise. One misinterpretation is about the Keynesian Multiplier, where
some determined number is multiplied by the construction costs, total revenue generated,
and other values to estimate the total economic impact resulting from the venue. Some of
these studies struggle with correlation versus causation issues, as growth can’t necessarily
be linked entirely to the construction of a new stadium. Again, this assumes that inputs
and outputs stay in the municipality, which is for the most part untrue, given that the
biggest displacement, player salaries, is unpredictable. Interestingly, according to
Keating (1999), the multiplier effect doesn’t exactly lead to the substantial impacts to
large market economies, as promised. In New York, the comptroller estimates that all of
the professional teams in the metropolitan New York City area account for a total of
$1.15 billion in economic activity, based on generous multipliers (Keating 1994). This
surmounts to only 0.3 percent of the regional economy, resulting from nine professional
sports teams. In addition, these multipliers added to subsidies may not even be positive,
as the average resident’s tax increases may cause total spending to be diminished
(Keating 1994). If the positive multiplier implies the circulation of spending surrounding
the venue, then a tax increase would cause a reduction of spending in all areas, and
decrease the net effect. Also, Coates and Humphreys (2000) point out that many of the
arguments based on growth from stadiums is a result of a focus on gross, not net,
spending, the two leading to highly different outcomes.
As such, the “substitution effect” implies that simply because sports-related
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spending increases, total city spending is hardly changed. This is because people would
have spent this money elsewhere, had the stadium not existed. Wealth is redistributed,
rather than created, so the further developments allegedly stemming from the venue’s
construction, may not be relevant. Delaney adds that if we assume consumers have
“relatively stable entertainment budgets that they split among different activities,”
(Delaney 28), only consumer preferences are changing. The results of these studies may
be limited, but we can be reasonably certain that the public investment is not
economically beneficial as argued.
But sometimes the public should be required to help pay for common goods, that
will benefit the community. Chema (1996), a proponent of subsidies, proposes thinking
of sports stadium and arena investments as infrastructure, rather than entertainment.
Returns from said investments are often intangible, but they open new doors to further
progress. While these buildings are often grand and do lead to other progress (whether
substantial or not), stadiums don’t constitute public infrastructure since they can’t be
freely accessed by the masses. Even referencing a fee-based public good, such as a toll
road, is invalid since the usage price is much more affordable to the average citizen than
that of a ballgame. Coates (2010) agrees with Chema that the investment in stadiums is
like investing in roads, but if so, is public money really going towards the “highest
return,” as is required of effective policy? Is there more to gain from a professional
ballpark than a public high school? Precise conclusion is difficult, but I have trouble
believing that stadiums bring equitable returns on investment.
Yet as many politicians will argue, the taxpayer investment may only a minimal
contribution. They maintain that the public isn’t being required to pay that much money,
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per capita. Suppose that per capita spending would only equate to $50 over five years.
For a non-sports fan, is this nominal tax increase justifiable at all? Where does
democracy interject? Even if it spurs regional economic development, it’s unclear
whether the marginal growth can justify a significant tax increase. Politicians have the
capability to argue that any publicly funded endeavor leads to economic or regional spinoff. I’m hesitant to agree that the opening of a few bars and restaurants in the wake of a
new stadium constitutes a substantial urban renewal; however, the byproducts of stadium
construction are not the main focus of this paper. I’m more concerned with the priorities
of many American cities, and why sports entertainment seems to supersede many other
necessities.
Given the present day trend of government money towards stadiums, team owners
may demand the subsidy money based on precedent. Sports have always enjoyed special
privileges such as antitrust exemptions, waiver of environmental restrictions, subsidies,
and favorable lease agreements based on revenue, and team owners will continue to use
the past circumstances as leverage. Plus, the entire benefit of public money stays with
the players and owners of teams, as fans likely see no subsidy money towards ticket
prices, becoming victims of the all-powerful owners’ leverage. One wonders how this
trend will ever be reversed, given the changes in labor agreements in professional sports.
Free agency is a fairly new opportunity for players’ ability to affect the subsidy
game. The movement of players as a commodity on an open market is a phenomena that
has contributed to an increased urgency to build new stadiums. Owners of teams
demand the services of star, mid-level, and more inexpensive talent, and compete for
these players on an open market, knowing that the players have the ability to move to a
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more attractive franchise at will. As a result, owners demand tax revenues and cost
assistance to be able to keep a competitive team in town. More disposable income to
spend on player talent, along with a reputable forum to display their talents, can lead to a
better product on the field, and in turn, high attendance figures. But does this mean that
residents are paying incremental taxes to build a winning team?
Surely free agency requires teams to provide adequate stadiums, but it holds no
teams accountable of maintaining a substantial on-field product, to give fans something
to be excited about. Since professional sports teams are franchised in a league, they are
given relative authority to manage the team’s construction and player acquisitions, and
when they don’t receive the public assistance demanded, chaos can occur.
Most notably is the case of the MLB’s Florida Marlins, in their legendary journey
from triumph to misery. In 1997, the four-year-old team heavily increased its payroll
costs, and it paid off, winning them the World Series. But it was only short lived, as the
ownership demanded significant public funds towards a new stadium prior to the season,
arguing that other teams with new buildings were winning, and that sharing a building
with an NFL team was uncomfortable (Keating 1999). To put pressure on the city, the
owner threatened to sell the team, but no further public money was granted, and nuclear
results ensued. Upon winning the championship, the owner cut payroll by 70%, making
a contention for a repeat impossible, as the team went on to have the worst season in
MLB history in the year after winning a title. The team was subsequently sold, and the
incoming owner’s agenda was quite similar, to the dispair of the fans: more public
money.
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But maybe sports make the city a better place, by bringing everyone together
around a common interest. Eckstein notes that subsidy proponents frequently disregard
economic literature, and instead focus on the intangible benefits, namely “community
self-esteem, and community collective conscience” (Eckstein 236). Going to a game is
an exceptional way to unite around a common goal, while cheering and enjoying one’s
self. Politicians love ways to bring people together, and sports have a unique ability to
bring out the irrational, yet positive emotions. Not to mention, when people gather
together, they spend money together, thus supporting local businesses. Developers trying
to lure a team to their city are sometimes most concerned with the pride associated with
having a professional team and respective stadium in their city.
Being a “Major League City” is an attractive way to enhance a city’s image, but
the taxpayers shouldn’t have to bear the majority of the burden to help market a city’s
reputation. To the same degree, the threat to a city’s brand in the event of relocation can
be tragic, as the team is an integral part of the city’s culture. The extent of civic pride
created may be only limited to the team’s fans, and if the team is consistently losing, it
may also be a source of embarrassment. While these intangible, emotional benefits may
exist, the adamant disregard for the quantifiable welfare of taxpayers is quite alarming.

Further Arguments against Public Subsidies

Through discussing and objecting to the impracticalities of heavy subsidies used
towards stadium construction, it becomes clear allocating heavy percentages of total
construction are difficult to justify.
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Most uncertain is whether stadiums and arenas are truly public works, and the
numbers aren’t in favor of the public. Although both stances can be argued, private
parties attending the games benefit significantly more than the general public. Many
attendees come from outside the city, potentially visiting the city as sports tourists, and
may be enjoying the positive externality of not having to pay the tax increases. Likely
only a small percentage of resident taxpayers are fans of the teams playing in the stadium,
and an even smaller number attend the games. Regardless, the most rabid NFL fans can
only watch their team on the home field eight times per year. The unsettling truth is that
many residents can’t even afford the expensive ticket prices to use the stadium, yet
they’re paying for its construction. With the current popularity of the big four
professional sports leagues, all games are shown on television, and residents with cable
packages have the ability to watch all of the local team’s games, but this is reserved for
interested fans with access to the technology.
The unprecedented rate of stadium construction has led to a unique allocation of
public funds, namely to the hands of franchise owners. In the current state of affairs,
teams are given tax revenues without many liabilities, as they pay little or no rent on the
public land, and receive most or all of the revenue (Delaney 24). In some instances,
stadiums receive tax breaks, or further cost assistance. Usually, teams are also given
discretion to name the stadium, and implement operating policies, despite the fact that
cities may own a significant portion of the endeavor. Logically, the public sector’s
involvement in private operation leads to many inefficiencies, aside from the benefits
given to teams. Government-based decisions are politically driven, while private
decisions can be more efficiently implemented. The natural flow of goods and services to
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their optimal levels and locations in a market economy is entirely inconsistent with
government’s ill-advised seizure of private decision-making. Therefore, the government’s
involvement in these matters is riskier, jeopardizing residents.
All this love given to teams still isn’t enough to guarantee success for stadiums, as
a team could relocate even if it was supported financially. The current threat of franchise
relocation is no better displayed than the historical example of the NFL’s Oakland
Raiders, and their decisions to move from north to south and back north thereafter. In the
1960’s when their Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum was constructed with all public
money, the Raiders shared the building with the MLB’s Athletics. Although they were
heavily supported in Oakland, the Raiders sought to move to Los Angeles, a move
opposed by the city of Oakland and the league, which argued that the city had provided
adequate support for the team to stay. In a famous anti-trust suit, the Raiders won against
the NFL, and elected to break the hearts of Bay Area fans through their move to the Los
Angeles Coliseum.
Although the move resulted in only a brief stint in Los Angeles, concluding in the
outdated stadium’s inability to provide adequate renovation plans, the initial move south
demonstrates that no city is safe from relocation, even if significant public funds are
initially invested in the building. The city provided significant support through
attendance, subsidies, and their lease agreements, before the Raiders left, and again to
lure them back, but it’s debatable whether this was a good public decision. Further,
Oakland’s rabid fandom didn’t exactly represent the majority, as the agreement to bring
black and silver back to the Bay Area saw harsh public opposition, and was a
monumental factor in the Oakland mayor’s failed reelection campaign (Baim 94).
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As a result of its instability upon the Raider return, the Oakland Coliseum was
hanging by a thread, only to be bailed out by further governmental support. In the mid
1980s, the building’s chances of a positive net present value at the end of its lifespan
seemed grim, leading the government to alter their investment return interest for the sake
of saving the building and its tenants. In 1986, the city renegotiated its lease with the
city, largely regarding increased concession revenue to the Coliseum, which caused the
city to go from earning a $2 million net cash flow to losing $1.5 million annually on its
investment, but allowed the stadium to continue business (Baim 167). This building is
still in use, but is wisely regarded as a run-down structure in dire need of another
renovation.
Here, one is apt to label these subsidies and revenue deference decisions as
financially practical. This case is significant because Oakland’s persistence through
subsidizing the entire stadium, and taking all measures necessary, was almost not enough
to keep the team around. The city continues to lose money on the building, but football
and baseball remain integral parts of the area’s history and brand. Much of the stadium’s
success, aside from its ability to withstand the test of time, is a result of having double the
revenue, coming from two tenants. Had the Los Angeles experiment been successful, the
Oakland Coliseum (now called the O.Co Coliseum) may have been put out of use, as the
Oakland Athletics alone may not have generated sufficient revenue to keep the building’s
operations feasible. Other times, initial estimates may only appear financially justifiable
until the truth is discovered.
Projected costs of stadium construction are often deceiving metrics used by
proponents of public money towards the impressive endeavors. In my analysis, I came

17
across few stadiums that were constructed at a cost marginally close to the estimated
budget. Rather, these investments frequently cost the public a significant amount greater
than the already extravagant proposed per-capita tax increases. Through Baim’s 1994
analysis of fifteen public and privately financed stadiums in significant media markets,
the average stadium was built 78% over budget, with fewer than half of the buildings
constructed within 50% of the proposed budget (Baim 169). Some of this can be
explained by the lengthy development process, variable construction costs, and
bureaucratic red tape; however, it seems that underestimating stadium costs is a common
strategy implemented to convince residents of the affordability of stadium construction.
Regardless of the percentage of total cost subsidized, the new Yankee Stadium was
estimated to require a $129.2 million capital contribution in 2006, and by 2009, that
number had multiplied two and a half times to $325 million because of miscalculations,
according to the New York Times (Chan, 2009). This brutal miscalculation is a negligent
disregard for public welfare, and metrics like this should be more closely observed, or be
required to stay below a price ceiling. It should go without saying, if a team with the
grandeur of the New York Yankees has the extraordinary financial capability to pay three
players a contract total of $423 million, it can probably find a way to invest in a stadium
without forcing residents to bear a significant portion of the cost of the stadium,
regardless of their affection for the pinstripes.
Although it becomes obvious that many advantages of housing a city with
substantial public assistance are seen in non-economic, or unquantifiable benefits to a
city, net present value shouldn’t be ignored. I’m not arguing that stadiums must have a
positive net present value to be successful, but rather that if a stadium that can cover its
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fixed and operating cost in the long run, this can serve as an alternate determinant of the
stadium’s success. Cities investing in a stadium construction project should consider
costs and projected revenues, to assess the likelihood of return on investment, and the
expected lifespan of the building.
Unfortunately, stadiums don’t seem to be sound financial investments for cities,
using net present value as the determinant. I was unable to implement cash flows in my
model, as the data for my stadiums and arenas of choice was unavailable, however Baim
(1994) analyzed the accumulated cash flows of fourteen municipal stadiums, all of which
were at least ten years old, and found only one (Los Angeles Dodger Stadium) that had a
positive present value (Baim 170). Many stadiums and arenas operate at a loss, and only
some of those have the consistent ability to cover their operating costs. For reasons like
this, profit is also a limiting measurement of stadium success, since unique accounting,
combined with government assistance to keep the team running, allows teams to operate
at a loss, or suppress team and venue quality (and attendance as a result) to make a profit.
Team profit can also be highly correlated with a high public subsidy, implying that many
teams earning profit are unsuccessful. Given that I demonstrate that public money is
currently overused in these projects, the next section will further elaborate on those
factors which help achieve stadium and arena success.
Research and history show that successful stadiums can be built without high
subsidies. In deciding to implement only the venues in the top ten media American
markets, I assume that reasonable financial centers exist in each city, or that owners have
easy access to the main American investment hubs, such that developers and owners have
reasonable capability in coming across enough investors to pay for most of the cost of
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construction. Whether the owners are able to justify the sustained future value of these
projects is a separate discussion, but there are plenty of cases that demonstrate the
feasibility of private finance towards stadium and arena construction.
Quite intriguing is the unique ownership model of the Green Bay Packers of the
NFL. The team plays a Wisconsin city of little more than 100,000 people and the entire
venture is owned by the city, as opposed to the traditional format of a single owner or
partnership. This is the only team in sports with this type of model, and it has worked
well, as the Packers have sold out all their games for years, and are the face of their city.
Fans or investors can purchase stock in the team, and the burden of team finance is
placed on individuals willing and interested in accepting, a more efficient allocation. It’s
possible that this model might only work in a small market with extraordinarily loyal
fans.
In my sample of all the sports stadiums and arenas for all four professional sports
in the top ten American media markets (to be further discussed in the next section),
47.2% of the venues were built with less than half of the total cost paid by residents, and
also successful by the model’s definition. Further, 16.7% of the stadiums in the model
were built without any public money, can be labeled successful, and half of which were
built in my lifetime. Therefore, if heavy subsidies shouldn’t be implemented into
stadiums, and the venues can be built successfully without them, then a stadium can’t be
labeled successful with them. This led me to study the degree that various other factors
contribute to a successful stadium or arena.
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Explaining the Model

Through my analysis of sports stadiums in major media markets in the United
States, I argue that the two most integral components of a stadium’s success are
attendance and public subsidy percentages. For a stadium to be labeled “successful” in
this analysis, it must have both a minimal public subsidy for its construction, and an
adequate percentage attendance.
The sample includes all venues from the big four professional sports leagues
(MLB, NBA, NFL, NHL) with arenas in the top ten media markets, according to the
ProAdvance 2006 list. Large and small market teams face different challenges with
regards to factors such as attendance, stadium location, team value, and popularity, so
comparing venues from different market sizes appears invalid. Also, I assume that
politicians in densely populated metropolitan areas use different tactics to justify these
tax increases, especially given the priorities of bigger and smaller cities. Cities with more
industry and public works would have higher opportunity costs of public money towards
other important governmental sectors, or may justify per-capita tax increases on the
grounds that the incidence will be more broadly dispersed.
As previously discussed, public investment in stadiums has become a trend that is
unsustainable, inefficient, and undemocratic at its current rates. Evidence has shown that
economic data doesn’t defend high subsidies in these regards, and a city’s residents often
oppose the use of public funds for a private good. Further findings demonstrate that
stadiums can be successfully built and maintained without heavy public assistance, thus
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leading me to argue that residents shouldn’t be paying for a substantial portion of a given
new stadium.
Public money has, and will continue to be used to fund these private endeavors,
but I argue that since attending a sporting event is exclusively for private parties, the
public shouldn’t be required to pay for the majority of its construction. For the sake of
straightforwardness, I’ve ignored subsidies in real terms, instead choosing to focus on the
percent of the total stadium construction cost that is passed to the public. As such, a
stadium or arena can’t be labeled successful if it includes a subsidy that is fifty (50)
percent or more of total cost.
This may be a simplistic model, in that heavy subsidies may see only nominal tax
increases, however the defining principle is that if more public than private money is
used to finance the construction, then the stadium can’t be labeled successful. Certainly
bigger media markets tend to spend more on their respective teams, and my assumption is
that among the top ten media markets, total spending on stadium cost is related enough to
the city’s population, that I can assume a population would see a significant tax increase
if a 50% or greater portion of total building cost was levied for stadium construction.
This substantial tax increase from these subsidies is enough reason to oppose the project.
There is an exception, mainly because American sports are a timeless component
of American culture, and some stadiums have withstood the test of time, worthy of
recognition. Even given the constraints for success in this analysis, many of the oldest
stadiums and arenas are the most successful. Yet, there are a few historical buildings still
in operation that were built with high subsidies, or have waning attendance figures, that
must also be labeled successful, even if they’re not the buildings they used to be. For
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example, Anaheim’s Angel Stadium was built with all public money, forty-five years
ago, and has enjoyed consistently adequate attendance since. Also, Oakland’s O.co
Coliseum (originally named the Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum) has successfully
housed both the Oakland Raiders (NFL) and Athletics (MLB) since the 1960’s (despite
the Raiders brief move to Los Angeles), amid current criticism of its age and decrepitude.
These old and faithful buildings are historical landmarks, and represent the history of the
sport.
Given the erratic pace of new stadium construction, I’ve developed a “twenty five
(25) year exception,” that allows stadiums built with public money before 1986 to be
labeled successful, provided they’re still operational after their long history. In my
highly variable sample, the mean stadium age was 24.3, so I’ve determined that buildings
lasting a quarter century or longer are automatically successful, since they have
consistently seen substantial enough attendance figures for many years, to the extent that
they’re still selling tickets. Additionally, these potentially high-subsidized construction
costs have likely been paid off by now, and residents can enjoy their local sports without
having to pay a high price.
Put simply, one can’t label a stadium successful if its team’s fans don’t attend the
games. Just as stadiums are the office for team competition, they’re also built to house
fans, so low attendance figures indicate a mediocre to poor fan experience. Like all other
variables in the sample, attendance statistics are highly variable, depending on the type of
building and league standards. For a stadium or arena to have satisfactory attendance, it
must have an average percentage attendance above the league’s mean percentage
attendance in the most recent measurable year, 2010. This may be a fairly subjective
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metric, in that one year’s attendance figures may not be an adequate sample size of a
stadium’s long-term attendance patterns. However, if a stadium or arena has recent
attendance figures close to the league mean, and fails to exceed the league’s average in
the most recent year, adequate consideration is given to attendance figures from years
past, assuming the building passes the subsidy requirement.
Many professional sports stadiums and arenas have multiple tenants, and these
buildings deserve special attention, in that their total attendance generated can be twice
that of single-tenant buildings. My analysis of public subsidization of these buildings
stays consistent with single-tenant stadiums and arenas, but more attendance
consideration is given to buildings near the average for those housing multiple teams.
When evaluating attendance figures, winning percentages, and championships for a
corresponding stadium or arena with multiple tenants, the highest measured values are
displayed in the chart. Take the New York Jets and the New York Giants of the NFL
who both compete at Metlife Stadium at the Meadowlands, for example. Both teams had
2010 attendance figures above the league’s mean, however the Jets had a higher 2010
win-loss percentage (0.688), while the Giants have a greater all-time franchise winning
percentage (.544). As such, the highest values exhibited in the arena are shown on the
chart.
Attendance is a function of a multitude of factors, many of which are
unquantifiable, but this model serves to estimate which measurable determinants are most
correlated with stadium success. In combination with a subsidy of less than 50% total
cost, attendance is the most tangible measurement of stadium success. The foundation of
this analysis focuses on stadiums’ and arenas’ attendance figures during the respective
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teams’ seasons. Special consideration is given to buildings with multiple tenants,
regardless of the sport, to accommodate the additional total venue attendance. However,
the underlining truth of all stadiums is that they only make money when they are being
used. Even given the expensive ticket price revenue earned by popular sports venues,
there are few home games in a season. Teams in the National Football League, though
charging the highest average ticket price of all four American professional sports leagues,
only play eight home games per season, and may host few or many non-sporting events
in the building. Any theoretical stadium may only be earning revenue ten days per year,
and losing significant money annually, but my findings may label this stadium successful,
simply if it isn’t heavily financed by local residents, and has high average attendance
figures during the football season. The focus is on sport-related success, and the
contributing factors, not including secondary use of the stadium.
Through statistical software, I’ve implemented a logit statistical model, which
uses my definition of success as the independent variable (SUCCESFUL=1, NOT
SUCCESFUL=0) for all stadiums and arenas in the top ten American media markets. I’ve
recognized factors that likely contribute to success, which will be used as the dependent
variables. This model uses both binary and continuous dependent variables, and a binary
independent variable. The purpose of this model is to determine the odds that the factors
of success contribute to measured “stadium/arena success.” Further, the marginal effects
are analyzed, to determine the percentage change in probability of success with the
addition of another unit of the dependent variable. The theoretical model will be
explained next.
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Theoretical Model

The logistic model used in the analysis estimates the relationship between the
dependent variables, both continuous and binary (dummy), and the independent binary
variable of stadium success. The purpose is to fit a number of functions to an outcome
variable, {0,1}. This will indicate the probability relationship to success. The model

logit(p) = log(p/(1-p)) = β0 + β1*(Corporate Naming Rights) + β2*( Real Cost)
β3*(Mass Transit) + β4*(Age of Building) + β5*(Team Winning Percentage, History)
+ β6*(Team Winning Percentage, 2010) + β7*(Total Team Championships) +
β8*(Multiple Tenant Dummy)

yields coefficients βi that give the rate of change in “log-odds” as X increases by one unit.
Multiplying the coefficient by the exp function will yield the odds ratio (Probability of
success divided by probability of not), where the values greater than one indicate an
increase in the odds of success by the increase of one unit of X. The marginal effects,
dp/dβ = f (βX)β , represents the derivative of the logit function. For a dummy dependent
variable with a positive marginal effect, if X=1 the chances of success are higher by that
value, than if X=0, by the percentage of the coefficient.
Given that the sample is relatively small, it’s likely that the model may have two or
more dependent variables that are highly correlated with each other, often known as
multicollinearity. If so, the estimation of a single dependent variable, all else constant, is
less precise, given that is may be directly related to another. Often, high standard errors
result. Each dependent variable will be explained.

26

Corporate Naming Rights Dummy: As is so common in this day and age, corporate
interests can be found everywhere. One popular method of securing stadium revenue for
the building’s ownership, however, is by naming the building after a sponsor. These
deals often cost sponsors tens of millions of dollars per year, but serve as a steady
revenue stream for tenants. These deals are often made before the stadium is built, and
having this guaranteed revenue may allow a stadium to not require as significant of a
public subsidy to cover the building’s cost. Alternatively, developers of successful
stadiums may choose not to name the building after a corporate interest, believing that a
name such as Houston’s “Toyota Center” represents brand dilution for their team or
attaches a negative corporate connotation with the team’s image. If the stadium or arena
is named after a corporate interest, it receives a one, and if not, a zero.

Real Cost: Stadium construction costs can have a tremendous impact on the magnitude
of public money required to finance the building. I’ve converted all cost figures into real
2011 dollars terms. High costs may indicate a high quality, successful construction, or a
tremendous burden to residents that can lead to low attendance and high need for
government money. Financers of a $1 billion stadium are more likely to require a big
subsidy, than those of smaller projects.

Mass Transit: The presence of public transit systems, such as trains, but not highways,
facilitates the ballgame experience, as people can get to the game efficiently and safely.
Interestingly, stadiums without access to public transit can force people to spend more
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time in the neighborhood before and after the game, which argues in favor of public
support to initiate further spending in a metropolitan area. Theoretically, however, a city
may be more compelled to spend on a stadium with public transit, as the systems will be
heavily used on game day. Mass transit also implies that the stadium is located in a
heavily populated area, which is usually a preferred location to rural areas far away from
the general traffic. Nelson (2002) argued that these sorts of areas are most beneficial in
his study of location:

…metropolitan economies appeared to do better when major league teams
played anywhere in the central city but do poorly when major league
teams played in the suburbs. Linking a trip to the game with a nice meal,
some shopping, and visiting other attractions will result in more spending.
Downtowns usually do a better job of providing these opportunities than
suburban and most other central city locations…

Age of Building: Buildings that have survived for 25 years or longer are automatically
successful, but they often represent the most lucrative stadiums as well. Many would
argue that Fenway Park and Wrigley Field, the two oldest stadiums in use in American
professional sports, are the two best ballparks to watch a game, as spectators feel as if
they’ve traveled back in time to witness for the legendary occasion. These two
consistently sell out their home games, even with poor on field performance.
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Team Winning Percentage, History and 2010 1: Everything is better when the team is
winning. In this case, a thriving team can cause incremental attendance increases, but not
necessarily by enough to seat more people than the league’s percentage mean, on
average. Maybe a winning team isn’t enough of a reason to go to games in a poor
stadium. Also, this begs the question of which is more important: a winning season, or a
winning history. Storied franchises seem to bring many people to games, even if the onfield product isn’t what it used to be. Conversely, if everyone loves a winner, would this
give the city leverage and permission to increase taxes for stadium construction?

Total Team Championships: Professional sports, like any other business, buy low and
sell high. Upon winning a championship, teams may raise ticket prices, demand a better
venue, or sell off their players, all of which could adversely affect attendance. Of course,
winning titles also brings more fans in to watch the best team. Similar to historical
winning percentage, championships can make fans loyal for life, as they’ll always
remember the winning team, even when the current team is entirely dissimilar.

Multiple Tenants: Buildings with multiple tenants are more efficient, and are often well
constructed, since they need to attract fans of twice as many teams. Further, the values
analyzed for the multiple tenants incorporate the highest values of all the teams, so the

1

Note: Hockey records are measured in point percentage, not win percentage. In modern
NHL scoring, a team earns three points with a win, and zero with a loss in regulation.
However, if the two teams are tied at the end of regulation, both teams are assured at least
one point, as the overtime loser earns one, and the winner earns three. Teams with the
most accumulated points at the end of the season advance to the playoffs.
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building may be successful only as a result of one of the teams. Plainly stated, more
people come to the games if there are twice as many opportunities to do so.

By-sport dummy variables: Could football stadiums be more likely to be successful
than hockey stadiums, simply because of the game played in the building? Would
decision makers capitalize on the fact that more people like football than hockey, and
require all residents to pay a higher portion as a result? Are some sports more suited for
big markets than others? Unfortunately, these questions revealed nearly inconclusive
evidence, as will be discussed next.

Model Results

Table 1 shows the frequency distribution of successes, by sport, totaling to 23 out
of the 36 stadiums and arenas in the sample. From the table, I was surprised to find that
neither of the two hockey-only arenas was successful (NHL and NBA teams often share
an arena), but nine of the ten multiple tenant cases were successful. Hockey is often
considered the least popular of the major four American sports, but its union with
basketball in an arena greatly increases its chances of success.
Table 2 shows the stadium success predictors for each stadium or arena, based on
a regression that takes into account all dependent variables, and assesses the likelihood of
success. Many successful stadiums have a predictor around 90%, implying that many
factors frequently contribute to success, and consistency amongst these stadiums can be
used as cases for what a theoretical successful stadium may look like.

30
Table 3 shows the logit model results from a regression run with all variables
except by-sport dummy variables. The most relevant column is the marginal effect, the
derivative of the logit model. The interpretation with dummy dependent variables is
straightforward, as the value indicates the probability increase (or decrease) with the
presence of the variable.
Corporate naming rights significantly hurt a stadium’s chance at success by
27.7%, as an unsuccessful stadium may have difficulty obtaining sufficient investors, and
would need to sell naming rights to cover the cost, or receive sufficient governmental
assistance, rather than finance internally.
The presence of mass transit increases a stadium’s chance at success by about
10%, but this is not statistically significant. Also, having mass transit makes a stadium
1.8, or 80% times more likely to be successful. This analysis doesn’t cover whether the
mass transit is more related to low subsidies or high attendance, but furthering the study
would yield interesting results for policymakers concerned with infrastructure
investments.
Also noteworthy is that buildings with multiple tenants are 30.4% more likely to
be successful than single-tenant buildings. Combined with a high odds ratio of 6.5,
stadiums with more than one team have a better chance at success, likely because they
can have twice the opportunities for revenue. Unfortunately, teams playing on fields
continue to demand their own house to play, and their odds at building a successful
building heavily diminish.
Interpreting the marginal effects of continuous variables can become more
complex. For stadium age, all else constant, an increase in a year of age increases the
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venue’s odds of success by 20%. As for team championships, all else constant, winning
an additional championship increases the odds of stadium success by 41%.
For the two percentages variables, all else constant, an increase in a team’s historical
winning percentage by one percentage point will increase its odds of success by 12%.
But, by increasing the stadium team’s historical winning percentage by five percentages
points, the odds of success increase by 76%. 2 Both the team’s historical and 2010
winning percentages can be labeled significant at a non-traditional 75% confidence level,
but in comparing the two, it appears that the team’s historical figures lead to higher odds
of success.
Controlling for each sport becomes difficult, since including a binary variable for
each sport can lead to multicollinearity. The model fit was poor for controlling for a
single sport, all else constant. The best way to control for differences in tenant types was
the dummy for multiple tenants. The results from the regressions by-team are listed in
Table 4.
Analysis of the results, like the model itself, includes limitations. The model is
an imperfect tool to predict expected outcomes, to make decision making clearer, but is
by no means precise.
The sample is small, and results only discuss the results of 36 stadiums and
arenas, strictly in large media markets. Different results may have been determined with
a larger sample that included all buildings from all market sizes, but for this paper I
assumed that comparing large and small market stadiums and arenas is invalid.

2

Exp[ 5*Coef(Team Winning %, History=.1138267)]
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The regression values are also constrained. The “pseudo R-squared,” a tool used
to explain the proportion of binary “success” variance explained by the factors of success
is normally lower in logit than in other regressions, and is no different in this model. The
most complete model explained only 48% of the variance, implying much ambiguity and
noise. Further, many of the findings cannot be considered significant at high confidence
levels, as some p-values were too high for traditional confidence analysis. Like any
business decision, the model includes reasonable confidence, but no certainty in any of
the findings. As such, I’ve concluded the legitimacy of some variables at 75%
confidence, which can lack academic merit, but can still be a useful tool in decisionmaking.
Upon testing the hypothesis that different sports have different chances of
success, the results were nearly inconclusive. None of the p-values can be labeled
significant by any standards, but the results indicated that basketball arenas have the
highest chance of success, of any sport. When combined with other variables, in
substitution for the multiple tenant dummy, the pseudo r-squared heavily declined, and
the p-values decreased in most other variables. Studying the potential for success based
on the different sports played in the buildings could yield significant results if the model
were designed differently, and I cannot conclude that the two events are unrelated.
There are certainly other factors that can either define, or contribute to success,
which have been ignored. Quite simplistic is the independent variable for success, which
neglects basic components such as revenue and profit. These could make a more
complete definition of success, but also can be manipulated by team owners who spend at
different magnitudes to create a competitive team, and these financial values may not
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reflect the stadium’s circumstance. Many variables are unquantifiable, such as stadium
quality, or the general consensus of residents and fans. One significant factor is climate,
as even loyal fans may become uninterested or unable to attend a game in inclement
weather. Indoor buildings may accommodate some of this hesitation, but fans may still
be uninterested in driving to the game in the snow. Plus, some cities simply love their
team more than others. Stadiums with similar factors may be successful in one locale,
and flop in another, for unknown reasons.

Conclusion

Given the American passion for the visceral returns from sports entertainment,
professional sports will continue to occupy both the private and public sectors at the
expense of the public coffers. But the extent of support given to private industries has
been a matter of inconsistency for some time. In 1957, the mayor of New York City
warned residents, “If we began to subsidize baseball teams, all sorts of business
enterprises would demand the same things... They have to carry their own weight. We
will not be blackjacked" (Keating 1999). Professional sports possess a unique power and
immunity that must be closely monitored.
Most notable is the consistent ability of stadium and arena developers to receive
public contributions towards their private venues. Advocates argue that securing a
respectable stadium is required for attracting fans to the games, players to the teams, and
teams to stay in the city. Cities cite growth studies, and expect urban development to
spawn from the investment. Civic pride seems to come as a result, through uniting
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residents both physically in the community, and emotionally in favor of the team. The
public contributes to stadiums just as they would any public structure or utility, some
argue. In theory, the entire city is enhanced through a minimal contribution from all
taxpayers.
Economic studies have helped determine that these tax increases are harmful and
unnecessary to the public, and that democratic principles of public welfare are in
jeopardy. Public subsidies for stadiums don’t seem to do as promised, as the “spin-off
development” from construction doesn’t display the wishful trickle-down returns. Most
jobs are transferred, rather than created, and income and wealth effects are menial,
misinterpreted, and misleading. Further, the “multiplier effects” on the total economic
impact from stadium construction suffer similar issues of bias from subsidy advocates.
Often, the economic studies are ignored, and policy makers argue on the basis of
intangibles, through emotional appeal. Said attempts to rally the public only perpetuate
the inefficiencies of tax increases for private benefit. To the chagrin of the taxpayer,
stadium projects continually see tax increases involved. Widely accepted, and most
egregious, is the fact that these projects can be financed privately and still be successful,
concluding that public funds are highly overused for sports entertainment.
This analysis, through both the subsidy discussion and the factors of success
model, has applicability to city residents and leaders in the planning or development
phase of a new stadium. Residents must be aware of the potential for political abuse, just
as policy members must be strategic in their implementation, so as to protect the welfare
of the community. The statistical model provides insight into the legitimacy of various
quantifiable factors, and the likelihood they contribute to stadium success.
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Supplementing the model with an understanding of the balance between
practicality and merit of public subsidies would help both sides of the argument design
and execute a stadium plan with improved efficiency. Interestingly, the strongest
determinant of success, the binary variable for venues with multiple tenants, is also an
example of a practical plan that can generate twice the traffic and revenue of a single
tenant venue. Understanding the differences in odds that each variable will contribute to
success can help mitigate residents and developers towards strategic and effective
decisions, that can help reverse the trend of welfare reduction resulting from stadium
construction.
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Table 1: Stadium Success Frequency Table, by Sport
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)

Baseball
Football
Basketball
Hockey
Multi-Tenant
Success
NO

YES

0
0
1
0
1
0
1

2
2
1
3
0
5
0

0
1
7
5
1
8
1

2
3
8
8
1
13
1

Total

13

23

36

1) 2) 3) 4) 5)
Total
0
0
0
0
0
1
1

0
0
0
1
1
0
1

0
1
1
0
0
0
0

1
0
1
0
0
0
0
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Table 2: Stadium

Success
Predictors,
Success Ratings

Stadium/Arena

Yankee Stadium
Citi Field
Madison Square Garden
Metlife at Meadowlands
Prudential Center
Dodger Stadium
Angel Stadium
Staples Center
Honda Center
U.S. Cellular
Wrigley Field
United Center
Soldier Field
Citizens Bank Park
Wells Fargo Center
Lincoln Financial Field
Fenway Park
TD Garden
Gillette Stadium
AT&T Park
O.Co Coliseum
Oracle Arena
Candlestick Park
HP Pavilion
Rangers Ballpark
American Airlines
Center
Cowboys Stadium
Nationals Park
Verizon Center
FedEx Field
Turner Field
Georgia Dome
Philips Arena
Minute Maid
Reliant Stadium
Toyota Center

Success
Predictor

Success

0.95905
0.262426
0.997849
0.917982
0.872061
0.969785
0.313447
0.955225
0.158819
0.55973
0.982007
0.982245
0.99804
0.738396
0.986986
0.693433
0.997302
0.971419
0.99639
0.79869
0.997531
0.275397
0.969547
0.269853
0.094957
0.616725

1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1

0.893647
0.283353
0.701977
0.179939
0.265317
0.541016
0.028257
0.007858
0.08439
0.678955

1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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Table 3: Logit Model 1
Dependent Variable: Stadium/Arena Success Dummy
Log-Odds
Coefficient

Odds
Ratio

Marginal
Effects

Corporate Naming
Rights Dummy

-1.711516*
(1.364431)

.1805918*
(.2464051)

-.2771923*
(.20912)

Real Cost

.0538116
(.0686264)

1.055286
(.0724205)

.0087152
(.0111)

Mass Transit

.590436
(1.154681)

1.804775
(2.083939)

.095625
(.18557)

Age of Building

.1786804**
(.1075826)

1.195639**
(.1286299)

.0289386**
(.01671)

Team Winning
Percentage,
History

.1138267*
(.089695)

1.120558*
(.1005089)

.018435*
(.01332)

Team Winning
Percentage, 2010

.1029077*
(.0774172)

1.108389*
(.0858084)

.0166666*
(.01337)

Total Team
Championships

.3460254*
(.2350159)

1.413439*
(.3321805)

.0560413*
(.03946)

Multiple Tenant
Dummy

1.878355*
(1.638533)

6.542735*
(10.72049)

.3042131*
(.26617)

Pseudo R-Squared

0.4776

0.4776

0.4776

Number of
Observations

36

36

36

*Significant at the 25% level or better
** Significant at the 10% or better
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Table 4: Logit Model, By Sport
Substituting each sport individually for “Multi-Tenant” into Model 1 yielded less
significant results across the board. Below are the “By-sport” coefficients from four new
logit regressions, all of which are statistically insignificant, but still noteworthy:

Log-Odds
Coefficient

Odds
Ratio

Marginal
Effects

Baseball

.5371667
(1.2111)

1.711152
(2.072376)

.090199
(.20158)

Basketball

.9519084
(1.152256)

2.590649
(2.985091)

.1588104
(.19396)

Football

-.6825746
(1.297008)

.5053143
(.6553967)

-.1139899
(.21372)

Hockey

.000861
(1.396105)

1.000861
(1.397307)

.0001468
(.23808)
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